Massieu v. Atty Gen United States by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-29-1996 
Massieu v. Atty Gen United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"Massieu v. Atty Gen United States" (1996). 1996 Decisions. 129. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/129 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                          No. 96-5125 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                       MARIO RUIZ MASSIEU 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
        JANET RENO, In Her Capacity as Attorney General 
      of the United States of America; WARREN CHRISTOPHER, 
          In His Capacity as Secretary of State of the 
         United States; UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND  
        NATURALIZATION SERVICE; WARREN A. LEWIS, In His 
        Capacity as District Director of the Immigration 
     and Naturalization Service; DEMETRIUS GEORGAKOPOULOS, 
        In His Capacity as Assistant District Director, 
    Investigations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
                           Appellants 
                      ____________________ 
                                 
        ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
                   (D.C. Civil No. 96-00104) 
                      ____________________ 
                                 
                     Argued:  May 10, 1996 
     Before:  GREENBERG, ALITO, and McKEE, Circuit Judges: 
                (Opinion Filed:  July 29, 1996) 
                      ____________________ 
 
                   Frank W. Hunger 
                   Assistant Attorney General 
                   Gary G. Grindler 
                   Stephen W. Preston 
                   Deputy Assistant Attorneys General 
                   Douglas N. Letter 
                   Jacob M. Lewis (Argued) 
                   David J. Kline       
                   Attorneys, Civil Division 
                   Department of Justice, Room 3617 
                   9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
                   Washington, D.C. 20530 
 
          
                   Attorneys for Appellants 
 
                   Cathy Fleming, Esq. (Argued) 
                   Camille M. Kenny, Esq. 
                   Fleming, Roth & Fettweis 
                   744 Broad Street, Suite 701 
                   Newark, New Jersey 07102 
                    Attorney for Appellee 
                    
                       ____________________ 
                                  
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                       ____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
         This is an appeal from an order of the district court 
declaring unconstitutional  241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (the "INA" or the "Act"), 8 U.S.C.  
1251(a)(4)(C)(i), and enjoining further deportation proceedings 
against plaintiff under that provision.  Entertaining 
jurisdiction over plaintiff's constitutional claims under 28 
U.S.C.  1331, the district court held that  241(a)(4)(C)(i) 
violates the Due Process Clause because it is impermissibly vague 
and deprives aliens such as plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard.  In addition, the court held that  241(a)(4)(C)(i) 
represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.   
         We do not reach the merits of the constitutional 
questions decided by the district court.  Instead, we hold that 
the district lacked jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claims.  
Under  106 of the INA, 8 U.S.C.  1105a, if plaintiff wished to 
challenge the efforts to deport him, he was required to exhaust 
available administrative remedies and then petition for review in 
this court.  Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order, 
and we remand to the district court with an instruction to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint. 
                                I. 
         A.  The relevant allegations of plaintiff's complaint, 
which were set forth in detail by the district court, see Massieu 
v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681 (D.N.J. 1996), may be summarized as 
follows.  Plaintiff Mario Ruiz Massieu ("plaintiff" or "Ruiz 
Massieu") is a citizen of Mexico who has spent most of his adult 
life working as an academic or government official.  From 1990 
until 1993, he was Mexico's Ambassador to Denmark; for part of 
1993, he served as the Deputy Attorney General; in 1994, he was 
the Undersecretary for the Department of Government; and from May 
until November of 1994, he again held the position of Deputy 
Attorney General. 
         Plaintiff's brother, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, was 
the Secretary General of the governing Institutional 
Revolutionary Party.  In September 1994, plaintiff's brother was 
assassinated in Mexico City.  Plaintiff, as the Deputy Attorney 
General, requested permission from President Salinas and 
President-elect Zedillo to allow his office to lead the 
investigation into his brother's death. 
         Plaintiff led the investigation for approximately two 
months before resigning both his position as Deputy Attorney 
General and his membership in the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party.  In a November 1994 speech, plaintiff announced his 
resignations and attributed them to efforts by the party to block 
the investigation into his brother's death.  The speech and other 
criticisms of the government were published in February 1995 in 
plaintiff's book, I Accuse: Denunciation of a Political Crime. 
         On March 2, 1995, Mexican authorities interrogated 
plaintiff concerning criminal activities allegedly committed 
while he was in office.  Later that day, plaintiff and his family 
entered the United States in Houston, Texas.  Plaintiff was 
granted a six-month non-immigrant visitor visa.  He and his 
family stayed overnight at plaintiff's Houston home, which he has 
owned since October 1994.  The next day, plaintiff travelled to 
Newark en route to Spain.  He was arrested in Newark by United 
States Customs officials and charged with failing to report all 
currency in his possession in violation of 31 U.S.C.  5316.  
Specifically, plaintiff was charged with failing to report about 
$26,000 of the roughly $44,000 in cash that he was carrying with 
him.  A few days later, the Mexican government charged plaintiff 
with several violations of Mexican criminal law. 
         Over the next nine months, the United States government 
brought four extradition proceedings seeking plaintiff's 
extradition to Mexico.  These were filed in March, June, August, 
and October 1995, and they sought extradition on charges of 
obstruction of justice and embezzlement.  However, two United 
States Magistrate Judges, sitting as extradition judges under 18 
U.S.C.  3184 and Rule 40.B.12 of the General Rules for the 
District of New Jersey, concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of probable cause to believe that 
plaintiff had committed the crimes for which his extradition was 
sought.  The extradition complaints were therefore dismissed. 
         The final extradition complaint was dismissed on 
December 22, 1995.  On the same day, the government instituted a 
deportation proceeding against plaintiff through the service of 
an order to show cause and notice of hearing.  The government 
alleged that plaintiff was subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. 
 1251(a)(4)(C)(i), which provides that "[a]n alien whose 
presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of 
State has reasonable grounds to believe would have potentially 
serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States 
is deportable."  On December 27, 1995, plaintiff moved for bail 
pending completion of the deportation proceeding.  After 
briefing, the immigration judge denied bail on January 11, 1996.  
The first stage of the deportation proceeding was scheduled to 
begin on January 19, 1996. 
         B.  On January 17, 1996, however, plaintiff sought to 
enjoin the deportation proceeding by filing a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
Named as defendants were Janet Reno, Attorney General of the 
United States; Warren Christopher, Secretary of State of the 
United States; the United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service ("the Service"); Warren A. Lewis, District Director of 
the Service; and Demetrius Georgakopoulos, Assistant District 
Director of the Service.  Plaintiff's complaint sought to enjoin 
the deportation proceeding on three grounds:  (1) "illegal de 
facto extradition," App. 19-22; (2) "selective enforcement," App. 
22-24; and (3) the "unconstitutionality of 8 U.S.C.  
1251(a)(4)(C)," App. 24-25.  On January 19, 1996, and January 24, 
1996, the district court granted plaintiff's applications for 
temporary restraints and a preliminary injunction, essentially 
staying the deportation proceeding pending consideration of 
plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction. 
         On February 28, 1996, the district court issued an 
order declaring  241(a)(4)(C)(i) unconstitutional on three 
separate grounds.  First, the court held that the provision is 
void for vagueness because it does not provide adequate notice to 
aliens of the standards with which they must conform and does not 
furnish adequate guidelines for law enforcement.  Second, the 
court held that  241(a)(4)(C)(i) violates procedural due 
process; the court reasoned that the provision deprives an alien 
of a meaningful opportunity to be heard since the Secretary of 
State's determination that he falls within the statutory standard 
is allegedly unreviewable.  Finally, the court held that  
241(a)(4)(C)(i) represents an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power because it lacks "sufficiently intelligible 
standards to direct the Secretary's exercise of discretion and to 
enable the court to review the exercise thereof."  915 F. Supp. 
at 707.  The court thus entered an order declaring the provision 
unconstitutional and enjoining deportation proceedings against 
plaintiff based on that provision.  The court also ordered that 
plaintiff be discharged from custody, but the court stayed its 
order until March 1, 1996. 
         Defendants appealed to this court and requested a stay 
pending appeal.  On March 1, 1996, we granted defendants' motion 
for a temporary stay, and on March 5, 1996, we granted plaintiff 
bail with conditions pending appeal.  We then granted expedited 
review, and we now reverse. 
                               II. 
         The defendants in this case contend that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's constitutional 
claims.  According to the defendants, if the plaintiff wished to 
contest his deportation, he was required to exhaust the 
administrative remedies available under the INA and then petition 
for review in this court.   
         A.  1.  In assessing this argument, our controlling 
concern is congressional intent.  See, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Bd. 
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 & n.4 (1982) ("[L]egislative 
purpose . . . is of paramount importance in the exhaustion 
context because Congress is vested with the power to prescribe 
the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in 
federal courts. . . . [T]he initial question whether exhaustion 
is required should be answered by reference to congressional 
intent.").  If Congress intended to delay federal court review of 
claims by aliens against whom deportation proceedings have been 
instituted until the conclusion of the administrative 
proceedings, then neither the district court nor this court can 
override that decision.  See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 
140, 144 (1992) (Bivens claim) ("Of `paramount importance' to any 
exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent.  Where Congress 
specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.  But where 
Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial 
discretion governs.") (citations omitted); Giammario v. Hurney, 
311 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1962) ("The recent amendment 
providing for exclusive review of final orders of deportation in 
the courts of appeals of the United States, 8 U.S.C.A.  
1105a(a), is challenged in petitioner's brief as violating his 
constitutional rights[.]  [W]e see no merit to [this argument].  
It is well settled that Congress may provide whatever procedure 
that it deems appropriate for judicial review of administrative 
orders.") (citation omitted); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 
U.S. at 152 ("Because Congress has not required exhaustion of a 
federal prisoner's Bivens claim, we turn to an evaluation of the 
individual and institutional interests at stake in this case.") 
(emphasis in original); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 
489 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1989); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 
U.S. at 502 n.4 ("Of course, exhaustion is required where 
Congress provides that certain administrative remedies shall be 
exclusive.") (citing Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 
U.S. 41 (1938)); Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 74 
F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir. 1996) ("It is settled that `when Congress 
has chosen to provide the circuit courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from agency [actions], the district 
courts are without jurisdiction over the legal issues pertaining 
to final [actions].") (alterations in Commonwealth) (citation 
omitted); Maxon Marine v. Director, OWCP, 39 F.3d 144, 146 (7th 
Cir. 1994) ("When a statute specifies a procedure for obtaining 
judicial review of a federal agency's actions, that procedure 
normally is exclusive.") (citations omitted); see generallySaulsbury 
Orchards & Almond Processing, Inc. v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 
1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1990) (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act) 
("We are also mindful of the fact that the exhaustion requirement 
in this case is statutorily provided and not judicially created.  
Although judicially developed exhaustion requirements might be 
waived for discretionary reasons by courts, statutorily created 
exhaustion requirements bind the parties and the courts.  `When a 
statute requires exhaustion, a petitioner's failure to do so 
deprives this court of jurisdiction.  Only if there is no 
statutory exhaustion requirement may we exercise our discretion 
to apply judicially-developed exhaustion rules.'") (quoting Reid 
v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985)); II Kenneth Culp 
Davis et al., Administrative Law Treatise  15.3 at 318 (3d ed. 
1994) ("Most agency organic acts do not address exhaustion.  When 
they do, however, courts are not free simply to apply the common 
law exhaustion doctrine with its pragmatic, judicially defined 
exceptions.  Courts must, of course, apply the terms of the 
statute."). 
         2.  We turn then to the question whether Congress has 
expressed an intention to preclude an alien in plaintiff's 
position from initially asserting his constitutional claims in an 
action in district court and to require the alien instead to 
exhaust administrative remedies and then petition for review in 
the appropriate court of appeals.  Our analysis of this question 
is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Thunder Basin Coal 
Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994).  Thunder Basin involved a 
statutory-review scheme similar to that of the INA.  Under the 
statute at issue in Thunder Basin, the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Amendments Act of 1977 (the "Mine Act"), 30 U.S.C.  801 
et seq., challenges to the Secretary of Labor's enforcement 
actions are subject to review by the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission, 30 U.S.C.  815, 823, and final orders 
of the Commission are reviewable by means of a petition for 
review filed in the appropriate court of appeals.  30 U.S.C.  
816.  In Thunder Basin, a mine operator filed an action in 
district court seeking pre-enforcement injunctive relief on 
constitutional grounds, but the court of appeals held that the 
Act's scheme of enforcement and administrative review precluded 
district court jurisdiction over the mine operator's claims.   
         In reviewing this decision, the Supreme Court began by 
observing: 
              In cases involving delayed judicial 
         review of final agency actions, we shall find 
         that Congress has allocated initial review to 
         an administrative body where such intent is 
         "fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."  
         Whether a statute is intended to preclude 
         initial judicial review is determined from 
         the statute's language, structure, and 
         purpose, its legislative history, and whether 
         the claims can be afforded meaningful review. 
114 S. Ct. at 776 (citations and footnote omitted).  Applying 
these factors, the Court found that "the Mine Act's comprehensive 
enforcement structure, combined with the legislative history's 
clear concern with channeling and streamlining the enforcement 
process, establishes a `fairly discernible' intent to preclude 
district court review in the present case."  114 S. Ct. at 780-81 
(citation omitted).  The Court added that "[n]othing in the 
language and structure of the Act or its legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended to allow mine operators to evade 
the statutory-review process by enjoining the Secretary from 
commencing enforcement proceedings."  Id. at 781. 
         Under the Thunder Basin test, we must consider the 
language of  106 of the INA, its stated purpose, its legislative 
history, and the overall structure of the administrative process, 
as well as whether plaintiff will be able to secure meaningful 
review of his claims after exhaustion.  We find that all of these 
factors suggest that, whenever an alien is the subject of 
deportation proceedings,  106 is intended to delay judicial 
review until after administrative exhaustion.  We thus conclude 
that there is a "fairly discernible" congressional intent to 
delay federal court review in the circumstances present in this 
case. 
         3.  Under  106(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.  1105a(c), "an 
order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any 
court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies 
available to him as of right under the immigration laws and 
regulations."  Section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.  1105a(a), 
further provides that, subject to statutory exceptions not 
invoked here, "the sole and exclusive procedure for . . . the 
judicial review of all final orders of deportation" is by the 
filing of a petition for review in the appropriate court of 
appeals pursuant to the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C.  2342.  In 
addition,  242(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.  1252(b) -- which sets 
forth a "specialized administrative procedure applicable to 
deportation proceedings," Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 308 
(1955) -- expressly states that "[t]he procedure so prescribed 
shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the 
deportability of an alien under this section."  8 U.S.C.  
1252(b).  Furthermore, even where an alien is attempting to 
prevent an exclusion or deportation proceeding from taking place 
in the first instance and is thus not, strictly speaking, 
attacking a final order of deportation or exclusion, it is well 
settled that "judicial review is precluded if the alien has 
failed to avail himself of all administrative remedies," one of 
which is the deportation or exclusion hearing itself.  See, e.g., 
Xiao v. Barr, 979 F.2d 151, 153 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 3 
Charles Gordon & Stanley Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure  
81.02[2], at 81-26-28 (1996) ("A person against whom a 
deportation proceeding is brought may feel that the proceeding is 
unjustified and illegal but generally has no right to go to court 
immediately to stop the proceeding.  Congress has provided an 
administrative device for passing upon an alien's deportability, 
and generally there must be a final administrative ruling before 
judicial review can be initiated."). 
         According to the legislative history of  106, the 
purpose of this section is "to create a single, separate, 
statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for 
the deportation and exclusion of aliens from the United States, 
by adding a new section 106 to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act."  H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966 (1961).  "[T]his section would vest 
exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal courts of appeals to review 
deportation orders," id. at 2971, and, "[i]n an effort to 
curtail, if not to eliminate repetitious and unjustified appeals 
to courts for interference with the enforcement of deportation 
orders, the section declares that an order of deportation or of 
exclusion shall not be reviewed by a court if the alien has not 
exhausted his administrative remedies."  Id. at 2971-72; see alsoFoti v. 
INS, 375 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1963) ("The fundamental 
purpose behind  106(a) was to abbreviate the process of judicial 
review of deportation orders in order to frustrate certain 
practices which had come to the attention of Congress, whereby 
persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by 
dilatory tactics in the courts. . . .  The key feature of the 
congressional plan directed at this problem was the elimination 
of the previous initial step in obtaining judicial review -- a 
suit in a District Court -- and the resulting restriction of 
review to the Courts of Appeals, subject only to the certiorari 
jurisdiction of this Court."); id. at 232 ("We believe that the 
controlling intention of Congress, in enacting  106(a), was to 
prevent delays in the deportation process by vesting in the 
Courts of Appeals sole jurisdiction to review `all final orders 
of deportation.'"). 
         The administrative regulation of deportation 
proceedings is detailed and comprehensive.  See generally 8 
U.S.C.  1251-1254; 8 C.F.R.  241-244; see also, e.g., United 
States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1990).  But for 
present purposes, a broad overview will suffice. 
         Deportability determinations are made initially by an 
immigration judge after a formal hearing.  See 8 U.S.C.  
1252(b); 8 C.F.R.  242.16(a).  If the immigration judge decides 
that the alien should be deported from the United States, the 
alien may pursue an administrative appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals.  See 8 C.F.R.  242.21.  The Board's 
decision is administratively final unless the case is referred to 
the Attorney General for review.  See 8 C.F.R.  3.1(d)(2), (h).  
Following final administrative action, the "sole and exclusive 
procedure" for obtaining judicial review of deportation orders is 
by direct review in the appropriate United States Court of 
Appeals.  See 8 U.S.C.  1105a(a). 
         A court of appeals may review a final order of 
deportation made against an alien within the United States and 
"all matters on which the validity of the final order is 
contingent."  See INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 937-39 (1983).  
Thus, the courts of appeals generally may provide meaningful 
review as to any properly exhausted claims directly attacking a 
final order of deportation.  See id.; see generally Gottesman v. 
INS, 33 F.3d 383, 386-87 (4th Cir. 1994). 
         Based on the above, we conclude that Congress intended 
to delay federal court review of claims by aliens against whom 
deportation proceedings have been instituted until the conclusion 
of the administrative proceedings.  Thus, plaintiff must exhaust 
his administrative remedies and, if he still so desires, file a 
petition for review in this court.  By filing suit in the 
district court to enjoin the deportation proceeding, Ruiz 
Massieu, like the plaintiff in Maxon Marine, not only failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies, but sought review in the 
wrong court.  See Maxon Marine, 39 F.3d at 147.  Put simply, 
Congress has removed jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims from 
the district courts and has vested exclusive federal court 
jurisdiction in this court after the exhaustion of available 
administrative remedies. 
         B.  In Thunder Basin, the Court recognized that a 
statutory-review scheme such as that contained in the Mine Act 
does not prevent the district courts from exercising jurisdiction 
over claims that are not of the type intended to be reviewed 
under that scheme, especially if such claims could not otherwise 
receive meaningful judicial review.  Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 
779.  Specifically, the Court stated: 
         This Court previously has upheld district 
         court jurisdiction over claims considered 
         "wholly `collateral'" to a statute's review 
         provisions and outside the agency's 
         expertise, particularly where a finding of 
         preclusion could foreclose all meaningful 
         judicial review. . . .  An analogous 
         situation is not presented here. 
Id. 
         Plaintiff argues that this "exception" applies here, 
but we disagree.  First, plaintiff's constitutional challenge to 
the statute is not like the types of claims that courts in past 
cases have considered "wholly collateral" to the administrative 
review process.  Second, delaying plaintiff's constitutional 
challenge until after he exhausts his administrative remedies 
will in no way foreclose meaningful judicial review. 
         1.  Plaintiff's constitutional challenge is not 
collateral to the provisions governing an alien's right to 
administrative and judicial review of decisions made in 
deportation proceedings.  Our analysis of this issue is guided by 
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991), 
which was discussed in both Thunder Basin and the district 
court's decision in this case. 
         In McNary, plaintiffs filed a class action challenging 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service's implementation of 
the Special Agricultural Workers Program.  The "narrow issue" 
before the Court was whether a section of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act that barred judicial review (except in 
deportation proceedings) of individual agency determinations of 
adjustment of status applications seeking Special Agricultural 
Workers status also foreclosed a general challenge to alleged 
unconstitutional practices by the Service in processing the 
applications.  Id. at 491.  The Court held that the district 
court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims. 
         In reaching this decision, the Court stressed three 
important points, each of which counselled in favor of district 
court jurisdiction in that case and each of which counsels 
against district court jurisdiction here.  First, the Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs' claims did not fall within the 
language of the provision of the statute that was said to 
preclude district court jurisdiction.  The Court noted that the 
relevant statutory language referred to "the process of direct 
review of individual denials" of Special Agricultural Workers 
status and did not address "general collateral challenges to 
unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in 
processing applications."  Id. at 492.  Second, the Court 
emphasized that the plaintiffs' challenge did not go to the 
merits of their applications for adjustment of status.  Id. at 
495.  And third, the Court found that, absent jurisdiction in the 
district court, the plaintiffs would not have been able to obtain 
any meaningful judicial review.  Id. at 496-98. 
         Not one of these points assists plaintiff here:  Ruiz 
Massieu directly challenges his deportability, and his claim is 
squarely governed by the statutory scheme; his district court 
suit goes directly to the merits of his deportability; and his 
claims will receive meaningful judicial review, if necessary, in 
this court after administrative exhaustion.  The Court's decision 
in McNary thus does not aid Ruiz Massieu here. 
         Our interpretation of McNary is consistent with our 
decision in Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'g, 
Yang v. Reno, 852 F. Supp. 316 (M.D. Pa. 1994).  Yi v. Mauganswas an 
exclusion case implicating  1105a(b) & (c).  We held that 
"in enacting  1105a(b) and (c), Congress permitted judicial 
challenges of orders of exclusion solely by way of habeas 
proceedings and only to those aliens who have exhausted their 
administrative remedies."  Id. at 504.  We distinguished McNaryand refused 
to condone plaintiffs' attempted "`end-run around the 
administrative process.'"  Id. at 507 (citation omitted).  We 
explained as follows: 
              Nor would any of the other cases cited 
         by Pan provide the court with authority to 
         ignore the explicit requirements of  1105a 
         in favor of a general grant of authority 
         under  1331.  Courts invoking  1331 
         jurisdiction have done so only when the 
         challenged administrative practice, policy or 
         regulation precluded adequate development of 
         the administrative record and consequently 
         meaningful review through the procedures set 
         forth in  1105a, and/or when the challenged 
         practice was collateral and divorced from the 
         substantive aspects underlying the alien's 
         claim[.]  In this sense, the holdings are 
         similar to McNary, and thus would be 
         inapplicable in circumstances, as those 
         present here, where judicial review is 
         adequate and where the challenge relates to 
         the merits of the final order. 
24 F.3d at 506 (citations omitted).  We concluded that we had to 
deny district court jurisdiction "where, as here, the challenge 
by the aliens is neither procedural nor collateral to the merits 
and where application of the specific statutory provisions would 
not preclude meaningful judicial review."  Id. at 507 (footnote 
omitted). 
         As examples of true procedural challenges collateral to 
the merits, we cited the following:  a class challenge alleging 
systematic inadequate translations of proceedings; a class 
challenge to actions of an immigration judge who refused to 
accept certain documents; and a class challenge to the Service's 
failure to give notice of the right to apply for asylum.  Id. at 
506-07.  It is clear to us that Ruiz Massieu's challenge in this 
case is neither procedural nor collateral in any of these senses; 
on the contrary, this is a direct challenge, by an alien who is 
the subject of deportation proceedings, to the substantive ground 
of deportation and thus to the merits of the eventual final 
order. 
         2.  Second, there is no doubt that plaintiff's claims 
can be afforded meaningful judicial review in this court after 
exhaustion.  Although the immigration judge is not authorized to 
consider the constitutionality of the statute, this court can 
hear that challenge upon completion of the administrative 
proceedings under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 938 (review by court 
of appeals of final order of deportation includes "all matters on 
which the validity of the final order is contingent"); see alsoNaranjo-
Aguilera v. INS, 30 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 1994) 
("Petitioners appealing order of deportation routinely bring 
statutory and constitutional challenges to INS regulations and 
policies.") (citations omitted); cf. Kreschollek v. Southern 
Stevedoring Co., 78 F.3d 868 (3d Cir. 1996) (permitting district 
court jurisdiction over claim under Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act where plaintiff's "claim that he has a 
constitutional right to a pretermination hearing is entirely 
collateral to his claim of entitlement to benefits" and where 
plaintiff "has alleged a sufficiently serious irreparable injury 
to lead us to conclude that the administrative review process is 
insufficient to afford him full relief").  Although plaintiff 
would prefer to have his claim heard by this court now rather 
than after the conclusion of the administrative process, we 
cannot upset the scheme created by Congress to provide plaintiff 
with a faster decision.  See, e.g., Maxon Marine, 39 F.3d at 147 
("[D]elay is not a valid ground for bypassing the procedures 
established by Congress for obtaining judicial review of agency 
action, procedures that include a mandatory resort to such 
administrative remedies as remain open to the aggrieved party, 
unless those remedies are palpably inadequate, which Maxon has 
not shown, resulting in serious injustice, which Maxon also has 
not shown."); see also Yang v. Reno, 852 F. Supp. at 326 
(exhaustion required "even if another scheme might at times prove 
more speedy or efficient"). 
         C.  1.  The district court found that notwithstanding 
the "express congressional intent" and "exclusive language of  
106(a) and (c)," courts "have excused exhaustion under the INA 
for certain constitutional challenges."  915 F. Supp. at 692 
(citing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 
(1991); Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1990); Rafeedie v. 
INS, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  The court then weighed "the 
purposes underlying the exhaustion requirement against the 
potential injury to the plaintiff if he is forced to exhaust his 
administrative remedies."  915 F. Supp. at 693 (citations 
omitted).  The court concluded that the "exhaustion balance in 
this unusual case tips powerfully in plaintiff's favor."  Id. at 
697. 
         We find this method of analysis misplaced in the 
circumstances of this case.  In light of the clear statutory 
language and congressional intent, we do not think that the 
courts possess the authority to excuse exhaustion whenever they 
conclude that a balancing of the relevant factors tips in that 
direction.  Rather, we believe that exhaustion is not required 
only if the claim asserted comes within the exception discussed 
in part II.B of this opinion, and as we have explained, this 
exception applies only if a plaintiff can establish that the 
claim being asserted is entirely collateral to the statute's 
review procedures.  Moreover, even if the plaintiff can make that 
showing, the plaintiff may also have to establish that meaningful 
review would be foreclosed absent initial review in the district 
court.  As already discussed, plaintiff in this case has failed 
to make either showing.  We emphasize here that resort to a 
general exhaustion balancing test should be avoided where -- as 
the district court recognized is true here -- Congress has 
expressly required exhaustion of administrative remedies by 
statute. 
         2.  We have held above that under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act plaintiff is required to pursue his 
administrative remedies and, if served with a final order of 
deportation, bring his challenge in this court thereafter.  Given 
the congressional intent to require exhaustion of administrative 
remedies and to delay judicial review until the end of the 
administrative process, we need not consider whether sound 
judicial discretion counsels in favor of or against requiring 
exhaustion.  Congress has already made that determination.  We 
nonetheless note that, contrary to plaintiff's assertions, there 
are important and potentially dispositive issues that should be 
resolved in the administrative process, e.g., asylum, withholding 
of deportation, and the adjudication of the statutory exception 
contained in 8 U.S.C.  1251(a)(4)(C)(ii). 
         Plaintiff has at numerous times in this proceeding 
indicated an intention to seek asylum in this country.  See, 
e.g., Plf. Opp. to Stay filed 3/1/96, at 2, 23, 25, Exh. 1, & 
Exh. 2.  It is clear that any asylum claim would be heard by the 
immigration judge who was presiding over the deportation 
proceeding and that a failure to assert the asylum claim in the 
deportation proceeding would likely result in waiver of that 
claim.  See 8 C.F.R.  208.4(c)(1) & (4).  Combined with 
plaintiff's statements that he intends to pursue an asylum claim, 
the regulations indicate to us that, absent the district court's 
injunction, the immigration judge would have had occasion to 
consider both asylum and withholding of deportation arguments.  
While the asylum claim is within the discretion of the Attorney 
General, withholding of deportation shall be granted if the alien 
satisfies the relevant standards.  8 U.S.C.  1253(h)(1).  
Moreover, despite plaintiff's claim that the Attorney General has 
predetermined the asylum issue, we have no way of determining 
whether the Attorney General will change her mind regarding 
plaintiff's deportation after plaintiff presents the evidence 
supporting his asylum and withholding-of-deportation claims. 
         Also, plaintiff argued in the district court that he 
came within the statutory exception contained in  
241(a)(4)(C)(ii).  Under that exception, an alien who shows that 
he is being deported because of past statements that would be 
lawful within the United States shall not be deportable unless 
the Secretary of State personally determines that non-deportation 
would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy 
interest.  See  241(a)(4)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C.  1251(a)(4)(C)(ii) 
(incorporating 8 U.S.C.  1182(a)(3)(C)(ii) & (iii)).  
Plaintiff's statutory exception argument is not frivolous, and we 
have no way of knowing whether the Secretary would have made the 
necessary statutory finding.  These issues could and should have 
been litigated before the immigration judge and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. 
         In light of the above, we cannot agree with the 
district court's statement that "[n]ot one of the purposes 
underlying the doctrine would be served by requiring exhaustion."  
915 F. Supp. at 697.  There are certainly issues to which the 
immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals will be 
able to apply their expertise, and the resolution of a number of 
those issues could well resolve this matter without the need for 
any involvement by the federal courts.  If this matter does end 
up in this court, at that point there will be no lingering doubt 
as to the administrative disposition of plaintiff's claims for 
asylum and withholding of deportation.  Moreover, the court 
presumably will have the benefit of an administrative record 
applying the statute and perhaps the statutory exception.  A 
number of the issues to be resolved through administrative 
exhaustion could entirely moot plaintiff's constitutional 
challenge, and this consideration cannot be deemed insignificant.  
E.g., Davis, supra,  15.5, at 332 ("[T]he Court has declined to 
resolve constitutional questions because of the petitioner's 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Moreover, those 
decisions are based on the important prudential principle that a 
court should not resolve a constitutional question if a dispute 
can be resolved on another basis that avoids the need to resolve 
the constitutional question.") (citations omitted). 
         Thus, even if a balancing test were appropriate in this 
case, we would find that exhaustion is required. 
                               III. 
         In sum, we hold that there is a fairly discernible 
congressional intent to delay federal court review of claims by 
aliens against whom deportation proceedings have been instituted 
until the conclusion of the administrative proceedings.  We 
conclude that plaintiff must therefore exhaust his available 
administrative remedies prior to federal court consideration of 
his claims.  We also hold that plaintiff's claims are not 
collateral to the Act's review provisions and that, if necessary, 
plaintiff will receive meaningful review of his claims in this 
court after final administrative action.  In these circumstances, 
we hold that the balancing test applicable in cases of prudential 
exhaustion is improper here.  Finally, although in no way 
essential to our holdings, we note that exhaustion in this case 
will serve important purposes and may even moot the need for any 
involvement by the federal courts. 
         For these reasons, we reverse the district court's 
order, and we remand this matter to the district court with a 
direction that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. 
 
                     
 
 
